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Abstract
We have developed abstraction/representation (AR) theory to answer the question ‘‘When does a physical system com-
pute?’’ AR theory requires the existence of a representational entity (RE), but the vanilla theory does not explicitly include
the RE in its definition of physical computing.Here we extend the theory by showing how the RE forms a linked
complementary model to the physical computing model. We show that the RE does not need to be a human brain, by
demonstrating its use in the case of intrinsic computing in a non-human RE: a bacterium.
Keywords Unconventional computing  Bacterial computing  Representation
1 Introduction
Many and diverse physical substrates are proposed for
unconventional computing, from relativistic and quantum
systems to chemical reactions and slime moulds, from
carbon nanotubes to non-linear optical reservoir systems,
from amorphous substrates to highly engineered devices,
from general purpose analogue computers to one-shot
devices.In another domain, biological systems are often
said to perform information processing. In all these cases it
is crucial to be able to determine when such substrates and
systems are specifically computing, as opposed to merely
undergoing the physical processes of that substrate.
In order to address this question, we have been devel-
oping abstraction/representation theory (AR theory). This
is a framework in which science, engineering/technology,
computing, and communication/signalling are all defined
as a form of representational activity, requiring the fun-
damental use of the representation relation linking physical
system and abstract model in order to define their operation
(Horsman et al. 2014; Horsman 2015). Within this frame-
work, it is possible to distinguish scientific experimentation
on a novel substrate (an activity necessary to characterise
the computational capabilities of a substrate) from the
performance of computation by that substrate. This is
needed to distinguish cases where a substrate superficially
appears to be computing, because it sometimes produces a
state that resembles a computational result (which can be
determined only by comparison with a separately com-
puted result), from cases where a substrate is reliably and
consistently producing desired computational results.
In work following on from the original definitions,
Horsman et al. (2017b) provide a high level overview,
Horsman et al. (2018) delve into more philosophical
aspects, and Horsman et al. (2017a) present an example of
intrinsic computation: signalling in bacteria. Also see
Horsman et al. (2014, 2018) for references to the wider
unconventional computing and philosophical literature.
AR theory requires the existence of a representational
entity (RE) to support the representation relation. One issue
glossed over in our previous descriptions of AR theory that
becomes crucial when analysing computation in systems
where the RE is not a human or conscious user, is the
relationship between the physical RE and the physical
computer. Here we enrich AR theory by incorporating the
RE explicitly, and showing how it relates to the physical
computing process.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2 we
summarise the current formulation of AR theory. In Sect. 3
we extend the theory to include the RE explicitly. In Sect. 4
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we demonstrate how the extended theory allows us to
capture and model intrinsic computing, including an
example in a bacterium.
2 AR theory in a nutshell
2.1 Our view of physical computing
AR theory has been developed to answer the specific
question of when a physical system is computing (Horsman
et al. 2014). The answer hinges on the relationship between
an abstract object (a computation) and a physical object (a
computer). It employs a language of relations, not from
mathematical objects to mathematical objects (as is usual
in mathematics and theoretical computer science), but
between physical objects and those in the abstract domain.
The core of AR theory is the representation relation,
mapping from physical objects to abstract objects. Exper-
imental science, engineering, and computing all require the
interplay of abstract and physical objects via representation
in such a way that their descriptive diagrams commute such
that the same result can be gained through either physical
or abstract evolutions (see Sect. 2.3). From this, Horsman
et al. (2014) define computing as the use of a physical
system to predict the outcome of an abstract evolution.
2.2 Representation
AR theory has physical objects in the domain of material
systems, abstract objects (including mathematical and
logical entities), and the representation relation that medi-
ates between the two. The distinction between the two
spaces, abstract and physical, is fundamental in the theory,
as is their connection only by the (directed) representation
relation. An intuitive example is given in Fig. 1: a physical
switch is represented by an abstract bit, which in this case
takes the value 0 for switch state up, and 1 for switch state
down. Note, however, that AR theory is not a dualist theory
in the sense of Descartes. Everything in the theory is
physical in some form. The symbols in the Abstract domain
in Fig. 1 are instantiated as ink on paper or pixels on the
screen as you read this. What makes them abstract in AR
theory is that this physical form is to some degree arbitrary,
and can change, while still corresponding to the same
abstract object.
An example of a physical object in the domain of
material entities is a computer. It has, usually, internal
degrees of freedom, and a physical time evolution that
transforms initial input to final output states. An example
of an abstract object is a computation, which is a set of
objects and relations as described in one of the logical
formalisms of theoretical computer science. Likewise, an
object such as a bacterium is a physical entity, and its
theoretical representation within biology is an object in the
domain of abstract entities.
The central role of representation leads to the require-
ment for a representational entity (RE). The RE supports
the representation relation between physical and abstract.
AR theory does not require the RE to be human, or con-
scious; see Horsman et al. (2017a) for an example of a
bacterial RE, which is expanded on in Sect. 4.2 here.
The elementary representation relation is the directed
map from physical objects to abstract objects,
RT : P ! M, where P is the set of physical objects, and M
is the set of abstract objects. We subscript the relation R
with a theory T to indicate that the relation is theory-
dependent. When a physical object p and an abstract object
mp are connected by RT we write them as p 7!mp. The
abstract object is then said to be the abstract representation
(under the given theory) of the physical object. This basic
representation is shown in Fig. 2a.
Abstract evolution takes abstract objects to abstract
objects, which we write as CT : M ! M. Again, we sub-
script with theory T to indicate that C is theory-dependent.
An individual example is shown in Fig. 2b, for the map-
ping CT ðmpÞ taking mp 7!m
0
p. The corresponding physical
evolution map is given by H : P ! P. For individual ele-
ments in figure 2c this is HðpÞ which takes p7!p0.
2.3 e-commuting diagrams
In order to link the final abstract and physical objects, we
apply the representation relation to the outcome state of the
physical evolution, to give its abstract representation mp0 ,
Fig. 2d. We now have two abstract objects: m0p, the result of
the abstract evolution, and mp0 , the representation of the
result of the physical evolution. For some (problem-de-
pendent) error quantity e and distance function d(), if
dðmp0 ;m
0
pÞ e (or, more briefly, mp0 ¼e m
0
p), then we say
that the diagram 2(d) e-commutes.
Commuting diagrams are fundamental to the use of AR
theory. If the relevant abstract and physical objects form an
e-commuting diagram under representation, then mp is a
Abstract
Physical
(0, 1)
R
Fig. 1 Basic representation has three components: the space of
physical objects (here, a switch with two settings); the space of
abstract objects (here, a binary digit); the directed representation
relation R mediating between the spaces
S. Stepney, V. Kendon
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faithful abstract representation (up to e) of physical system
p for the evolutions CT ðmpÞ and HðpÞ.
The existence of such e-commuting diagrams define
what is meant by a faithful abstract representation of a
physical system. The final state of a physical object
undergoing time evolution can be known either by tracking
the physical evolution and then representing the output
abstractly, or by evolving the abstract representation of the
system; and the two results differ by less than the problem-
dependent e. In the first case, the ‘lower path’ of the dia-
gram is followed; in the latter, the ‘upper path’.
Finding out which diagrams e-commute is the business
of basic experimental science; once commuting diagrams
have been established they can be exploited through
engineering and technology.
2.4 Compute cycle
Figure 2d shows the basic ‘science cycle’, of representing a
physical system, and determining whether CT is a suffi-
ciently good abstract model of its behaviour, by requiring
that mp ¼e mp0 for sufficiently many different initial states
p to have confidence in CT and RT . There are derived
variants of this diagram that capture the ‘engineering
cycle’, and the related ‘compute’ cycle. See the original
references cited in Sect. 1 for details; here we focus on the
compute cycle.
An e-commuting diagram in the context of computation
also connects the physical computing device, p, and its
abstract representation mp. But to do so it makes use of the
instantiation relation eRT : M ! P. Here, instead of saying
abstract object mp represents physical system p, we say that
physical system p instantiates abstract object mp. Whereas
the representation relation is primitive, the instantiation
relation is a derived relation, based on multiple science
cycles, abbreviated as eRT ; see original references for full
details.
The use of eRT acknowledges that a computer is phys-
ical system engineered (or possibly evolved) to have a
particular behaviour, rather than a natural physical system
being scientifically modelled. The full compute cycle is
shown in Fig. 3, starting from initial abstract problem,
through instantiation into a physical computer, physical
evolution of the device, followed by representation of the
final physical state as the abstract answer the the problem.
Abstract
Physical
p
mp
RT Abstract
Physical
p
mp
RT
m
p
CT (mp)
(a) (b)
Abstract
Physical
p
mp
RT
m
p
CT (mp)
p
H(p)
Abstract
Physical
p
mp
RT
m
p
CT (mp)
p
H(p)
mp
ε
RT
(c) (d)
Fig. 2 Parallel evolution of an abstract object and the physical system
it represents. a The basic representation: physical system p is
represented abstractly by mp using the modelling representation
relation RT of theory T . b Abstract dynamics CT ðmpÞ give the
evolved abstract state m0p. c Physical dynamics HðpÞ give the final
physical state p0. d RT is used again to represent p
0 as the abstract
output mp0 . If mp ¼e mp0 , the diagram e-commutes. (Adapted from
Horsman et al. (2014).)
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Ensuring that the diagram e-commutes is a process of
debugging the physical system, including how it is
instantiated (engineered, programmed and provided with
input data), and how its output is represented. This shows
another key difference from the science cycle: there the
diagram is made to e-commute by instead debugging the
abstract model.
The most important use of a computing system is when
the abstract outcome m0p is unknown: when computers are
used to solve problems. Consider as an example the use of
a computer to perform the abstract arithmetical calculation
2þ 3. The desired final abstract state, m0p ¼ 5, is not cal-
culated directly. Instead, the user infers that final state by
using the physical evolution of the computing device and
the representation of its final physical state, which yields
mp0 ; confidence in the technological capabilities of the
computer and the correctness of the instantiation allows the
user to exploit m0p ¼ mp0 to infer that the observed result is
the desired result.
This use of a physical computer is the compute cycle,
Fig. 3: the use of a physical system (the computer) to
predict the outcome of an abstract evolution (the
computation).
2.5 Generality of AR theory
Nothing in the above definition requires the physical
computer to be digital, or electronic, or universal, or pre-
existing. The computer could be a continuous analogue
device; it could be a mechanical or organic device; it could
be a hard-wired device with limited capabilities; it could be
a ‘one-shot’ device constructed for a particular
computation. It simply needs to be sufficiently powerful,
sufficiently accurate, and instantiatable, to perform the
RE’s desired computations: the relevant squares must exist,
and must be known to e-commute for the desired
computations.
And, of most relevance here, nothing in the above def-
inition requires the RE to be a human, or conscious, user.
We now show how to model the RE in the same context as
the computing system.
3 Including the RE in the model
3.1 Overview
As mentioned above, the representational entity (RE)
supports the representation relationR. Although it does not
appear explicitly in the compute cycle of Fig. 3, it is the
physical entity that ‘owns’ the abstract problem A and
‘desires’ the abstract solution A0.
To help clarify the issues, consider a (human) RE who
has the problem ‘‘I have two apples in my left hand, and
three in my right hand; how many apples do I have in
total?’’ We model this physical RE’s problem, how they
encode it as a computational problem, how this is instan-
tiated in a physical computer, how the computer finds the
answer, how the answer is represented back as an abstract
computational result, and how that result is decoded as an
answer to the RE’s problem.
In this section, we add the RE to the overall model of
physical computing as defined in AR theory. As before, we
have objects in two domains: the physical RE, and our
abstract model of the RE. (We refer to ‘our’ model, to
indicate that the abstract model of the RE is not a model
that the RE has constructed about itself, but a model that
we have constructed to explain the RE’s representational
and computational behaviours. There are several levels of
indirection at play here, explained in more detail in Sect.
5.2.) First we show how we model the RE in a manner
analogous to how we model a physical computation (Sect.
3.2). Then we show how to integrate the RE and full
physical compute cycle models, and how to interpret var-
ious parts of the resulting model (Sect. 3.3).
3.2 The physical RE
The RE is a physical system pRE (Fig. 4). The relevant part
of the RE here is the physical states that it uses to represent
its abstract problem A. Our abstract model of these relevant
parts in this and following AR theory diagrams is mpRE .
We model the computational system as before. There is
our abstract model mpc that forms the ‘specification’ of the
p
mp
RT
m
p
=ε mp
CT (mp)
A
encode
A
decode
p
program runs
H(p)
RT
Fig. 3 Physical computing in AR theory. An abstract problem A is
encoded into the model mp; the model is instantiated into the physical
computer state p; the computer calculates via HðpÞ, evolving into
physical state p0; the final state is represented as the final abstract
model mp0 ¼e m
0
p; this is decoded as the solution to the problem, A
0.
The instantiation, physical evolution, and representation together
implement the desired abstract computation CT ðmpÞ. (From now on
we omit the dashed line separating the physical and abstract world,
and rely on the different shaped boxes to indicate what components
lie in which domain.)
S. Stepney, V. Kendon
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RE’s problem mpRE encoded as a computational problem.
(This is the model mp in Fig. 3.)
The computer’s physical state may incorrectly imple-
ment the RE’s encoded problem, in which case the physical
state needs to be modified; the RE is using an engineering
model to specify pc (see Sect. 5.1 for the distinction
between an engineering and a scientific model). However,
our model mpc of the RE’s encoded problem may incor-
rectly represent the RE’s problem: we are using a scientific
model to capture the existing RE and its computer. We
model ‘the RE’s problem being physically encoded into the
computer’ (bottom line of Fig. 4) as ‘mpRE being encoded
into the computational model mpc ’ (top line). There is no
guarantee that such an encoding is possible: not all prob-
lems are computable.
The two representation/instantiation relation arrows in
Fig. 4 are with respect to two different theories. The rep-
resentation RTRE : pRE ! mpRE is based on the theory of
how the physical RE forms abstract problem specifications;
the instantiation eRTc : mpc ! pc is based on the theory of
how the physical computer implements abstract
computations.
In a correctly implemented computer, the diagram in
Fig. 4 should e-commute: the instantiated state of the
physical computer should correctly mirror the desired state
of the physical RE: it should physically encode the desired
state. The establishment of this physical encoding link is
part of the engineering process of instantiating the physical
computer.
During the execution, this physical encoding link is not
necessarily established immediately. There may be some
delay, for example in updating a record to reflect reality, or
in opening or closing a valve to reflect changed demand. In,
for example, a mechanical control system, with feedback,
there can be an immediate coupling: the behaviour of the
physical controlled system (a proxy for the RE, see Sect. 6)
changes its state, which is directly communicated to the
physical controller though their physical mechanical cou-
pling. We do not consider this aspect further here, although
it is a key feature of correctly-engineered computational
‘mirror worlds’ and of feedback control systems.
3.3 The physical RE in the compute cycle
We can now add this physical RE layer to the previous
compute cycle. See Fig. 5 for the full compute cycle
including the representational entity. Notice how the RE
adds another dimension (cube instead of square) to the
diagrams. Each dimension is a level of indirection or
representation.
The full compute cycle involves traversal of many faces
and edges of the displayed cube. Each face has its own
place in the model.
Consider again a (human) RE who has the problem ‘‘I
have two apples in my left hand, and three in my right
hand; how many apples do I have in total?’’
Back face; RE’s view of the computation (Fig. 6): the
RE’s desired states, starting from a problem state (physical
brain state with a problem, pRE; abstract initial state rep-
resenting the brain-state’s problem, mpRE , ‘‘how many
apples?’’) and resulting in a solution state (abstract final
state, m0pRE , ‘‘five apples!’’; physical state, p
0
RE, a brain state
that captures that abstract solution). There is no direct path
from initial to final state, either abstractly or physically, as
pRE
mpRE
RTRE
mpc
encode
pc
physically encode
RTc
Fig. 4 The relationship between the physical representational entity
pRE and the physical computer pC via abstract models of each. There
is an encoding of the abstract model mpRE into mpC . In a correctly
working system, this encoding is appropriately implemented by the
respective physical systems: the square should e-commute. Note that
the models of the RE and the computer are potentially with respect to
different theories
pc
mpc
Rc
m
pc
Cc
pc
Hc
Rc
pRE
mpRE
RRE
m
pRE
CRE
pRE
HRE
RRE
physically
encode
encode
physically
decode
decode
Fig. 5 The full compute cycle including the representational entity
and the physical computer. The desired change in the RE’s state, from
posed problem to perceived solution, is pRE ! p
0
RE. The physical
computer performs pc ! p
0
c. The full compute cycle from AR theory
is: represent RE’s physical state pRE (desired computation) as abstract
model mpRE ; encode to computational model mpc ; instantiate into
physical computer state pc; physical computer evolves to final state
p0c; represent physical solution as abstract computational solution m
0
pc
;
decode to final abstract problem solution m0pRE ; which models the
instantiation of the final state of the RE. Each set of squares (between
representational entity and physical computer, and across the compute
cycle) should e-commute
The representational entity in physical computing
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a separate computer is used to achieve the desired state
changes.
Left face; encoding the problem (Fig. 4): the RE’s initial
physical and abstract state encoded into the computer’s
initial physical and abstract states. The RE’s abstract
problem mpRE of ‘‘how many apples?’’ can be encoded as
the computer’s initial abstract state mpc ‘‘2þ 3’’. This is
instantiated as the computer’s initial physical state pc,
2þ 3 . The RE pRE physically encodes the problem in the
computer’s initial state pc by, for example, pressing the
keys labelled 2 then þ then 3 . (How this human RE
manages to press the keys, given the apples they are cur-
rently holding, is an exercise left to the reader.)
Front face; compute cycle (Fig. 3, which also includes
the back face RE abstract models as its ‘abstract problem’
components): the original simple AR theory compute
cycle, ignoring the role of the RE. The abstract computa-
tional problem mpc is instantiated in the computer’s initial
physical state pc,
2þ 3 . Physical evolution is initiated by
pressing ¼ , and the physical computer evolves as given
by its physical structure, Hc, which results in the final
physical state p0c of
5 . This is represented as the final
abstract state m0pc of ‘‘5’’. These three steps (instantiation,
physical evolution, representation) implement the desired
abstract computation Cc: ‘‘2þ 3 ¼ 5’’.
Right face; decoding the solution (Fig. 7): the RE’s final
physical and abstract state decoded from the computer’s
final physical and abstract state. The computer’s final
physical state p0c (some kind of pattern of lights in the
shape of a figure 5) is represented as the final abstract state
m0pc of ‘‘5’’. This is decoded to the RE’s final abstract state
m0pRE of ‘‘five apples!’’. The RE’s final physical brain state
p0RE is an instantiation of this, physically achieved by the
RE looking at and physically decoding the output from the
computer.
Top face; abstract use of a computer (Fig. 8): the purely
abstract view of the (modelled) RE encoding its problem
into a (modelled) computation, and decoding the desired
solution. There is no direct path from initial to final abstract
states as the physical computer is used to achieve the
desired abstract state changes. In terms of classical
refinement theory (Clark et al. 2005; He et al. 1986), CRE
can be thought of as the ‘global-to-global’ requirement
(although here this need not be captured in a formal
manner), with ‘‘encode, computation Cc, decode’’ corre-
sponding to the ‘‘initialisation, operation, finalisation’’
steps.
Bottom face; physical use of a computer (Fig. 9): the
purely physical view of the RE encoding its problem in a
physical computer, and decoding the desired solution. That
this is a computation, rather than some other activity, is
established by the abstract models and the various e-com-
muting squares.
The full compute cycle for the apples example is shown
in Fig. 10. All of these relationships must be correctly
implemented and modelled (the relevant squares contain-
ing encoding, decoding, instantiation, and representation
must e-commute) for the actual physical RE final state p0RE
to be the desired physical RE final state, that is, for the
physical computer to have been used correctly, and for it to
have performed correctly, to solve the RE’s problem.
pRE
mpRE
RRE
m
pRE
CRE
pRE
HRE
RRE
Fig. 6 The RE’s view of the problem solution (back face of Fig. 5).
The RE has an initial physical state pRE , modelled as mpRE . It has a
desired final state p0RE, modelled as m
0
pRE
. Both the horizontal arrows
are dashed, as they are implemented in a different medium: the
computer
m
pc
pc
Rc
m
pRE
pRE
RRE
physically
decode
decode
Fig. 7 Decoding the solution
from the computer to the RE
(right face of Fig. 5). The final
state of the computer, p0c, is
represented as the final abstract
state m0pc ; this is decoded to the
final abstract state of the RE,
m0pRE ; and instantiated as the
RE’s final physical state. This
is the model of the physical
decoding lower arrow, achieved
by the RE physically interrogat-
ing the computer
mpc mpc
Cc
mpRE mpRE
CRE
encode
decode
Fig. 8 The abstract model of the RE’s use of the computer to solve its
problem (top face of Fig. 5). The RE has an initial abstract state mpRE ;
this is encoded into the initial abstract state of the computer mpc . The
computer performs its calculations to produce its final state m0pc ,
which is decoded to produce the desired final state of the RE, m0pRE .
Both the horizontal arrows are dashed, as they are implemented in a
different medium: the physical computer
S. Stepney, V. Kendon
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4 Examples
4.1 Intrinsic computing: ‘mental arithmetic’
The person with the apples does not need to use an external
calculator; they can add up in their head, they can compute
intrinsically. (This also solves their problem of pressing
keys with their hands full of apples.) Figure 11 illustrates
this. Here, the RE (back face) and the abstract model (top
face) are as in Fig. 10, but the physical calculator is dif-
ferent. Instead of pressing keys on an external calculator,
the RE ‘sets’ their own brain into the appropriate state,
executes the calculation internally, and then ‘reads’ the
resulting state. This uses an evolved, rather than engineered
mechanism: the brain. It has been engineered (trained) to
some degree through schooling, and there have been suf-
ficient ‘experiments’ (exams) in the past to have confidence
that the error e is sufficiently small (zero) for simple
calculations.
4.2 Intrinsic computing in bacteria
Humans are not the only organisms who can compute
intrinsically. Figure 12 shows the RE and the compute
cycle in the case of the problem of bacterial computing.
This example was originally studied in Horsman et al.
(2017a) to demonstrate that it is possible to have compu-
tation with a non-human RE. However, without the explicit
modelling of the bacterial RE, it resulted in a somewhat
circuitous description. With the RE here explicitly present,
the model is much clearer.
The physical RE, pRE, is a bacterium, with a receptor at
the front, and a flagellar motor at the back. In the absence
of input at the receptor, the motor is off; input causes the
motor to switch on, propelling the bacterium towards food.
(As ever, the biology is more complicated than this;
Horsman et al. (2017a) should be consulted for further
biological details.) The abstract problem, CRE, that the RE
wants to solve is ‘‘if there is food, move towards it’’. This is
encoded as the abstract computational problem Cc: ‘‘if
there is a signal, switch the motor on’’. The abstract signal
is instantiated as a particular chemical; the physical RE
physically encodes the reception of exterior food as the
presence of an internal chemical, chem X.
This chemical physically propagates through the bac-
terium, undergoing transformation via a biochemical
pathway, such that another chemical becomes present at
the rear. The presence of this other chemical, chem Y, is
represented as switching on the (abstract) motor, which is
decoded as the answer to the bacterium’s problem: to
pc pc
Hc
pRE pRE
HRE
physically
encode
physically
decode
Fig. 9 The physical system of the RE’s use of the computer to solve
its problem (bottom face of Fig. 5). The physical RE has an initial
physical state pRE; this is physically encoded into the initial physical
state of the computer pc. The computer evolves over time to produce
its final state p0c, which is decoded to produce the desired final state of
the physical RE, p0RE
2 + 3 =
“2 + 3”?
Rc
“5”!
Cc
5
calculate
Rc
person
how many?
RRE
5 apples!
CRE
person
HRE
RRE
press
keys
encode
read
display
decode
Fig. 10 The full compute cycle for the RE using a calculator to
determine their apple total
brain state
“2 + 3”?
Rc
“5”!
Cc
brain state
calculate
Rc
person
how many?
RRE
5 apples!
CRE
person
HRE
RRE
set brain
state
encode
read brain
state
decode
Fig. 11 The full compute cycle
for the RE using their intrinsic
calculational ability to
determine their apple total
The representational entity in physical computing
123
move. It is physically decoded as activating the flagellar
motor.
The bottom face of this bacterial-compute cube shows
the purely physical computing: The bacterial RE physically
encodes the detection of food by its receptor as a chemical
chem X; the biochemical pathway moves and transforms
this chemical signal to the rear where it appears as chem Y.
The resulting chemical is physically decoded: it attaches to
and activates the flagellar motor. The physical problem, of
detecting food and moving towards it, has been solved.
That this is indeed a computation, rather than a purely
physical process, is argued in Horsman et al. (2017a):
chem X, chem Y, and the pathway are in some sense ‘ar-
bitrary’ (they comprise different molecules in different
bacterial species), and so it is not their specific physical
properties, but their representational, informational prop-
erties, that are being exploited. We are able to model the
part of the bacterium that represents the problem as mpRE ,
and the part that encodes into the computer mpc in a way
that convincingly contains the right sorts of representation.
With representation (and hence a representational entity)
identified, we can conclude that there is abstract data being
processed, not mere physical material being exploited.
With e-commuting diagrams present, we can conclude that
computation is present.
There are similarities with the argument here and the
field of biosemiotics, which talks of representations and
signs, and postulates that ‘‘The semiosic–non-semiosic
distinction is coextensive with the life–nonlife distinction’’
(Kull et al. 2009). For the presence of computation, we
require representation, that the chemical be a ‘signal’ or
‘sign’ beyond its mere physical properties; we determine
that it is so by showing a different chemical can provide the
same signal.
Horsman et al. (2017a) also discuss the energy transport
process in photosynthesis, as an example of a process that
is not computation under our definition. There is no
abstract information processing occurring, no intrinsic
representational activity, no signal, simply physical energy
transport.
4.3 Extrinsic computing with bacteria
Not all computing done by bacteria is intrinsic: other REs
can exploit bacterial functions to perform extrinsic com-
putation for their own ends. Various gene-engineered
bacteria and cells have been proposed as computational
devices, see, for example, Amos et al. (2015); Gardner
et al. (2000). Consider a simple bacterium gene-engineered
to perform some computational task, and its used by a
human RE, Fig. 13.
The person has a question that they can encode into an
input to their bacterial computer; it computes to produce a
final state that is represented by an output; that output is
decoded into the answer, and the person’s brain state
updates to include the answer to their question.
That this is a computation that involves representation
can be determined by interrogating the user as RE. So,
unlike the intrinsic bacterial computation of the previous
section, the bacterium is the computer and not the RE, and
there is no need to demonstrate the existence of represen-
tation independently.
5 Modelling issues
There are multiple models used in our description of
computation, which have some subtle differences, descri-
bed here.
5.1 Scientific v engineering models
There are two kinds of model at play in these diagrams and
our analysis.
chem X
signal?
Rc
motor !
Cc
chem Y
signal pathway
Rc
bacterium
food?
RRE
move!
CRE
bacterium
HRE
RRE
physically
encode
encode
physically
decode
decode
Fig. 12 The full compute cycle for the bacterial intrinsic computing
system. See text for details
bacterium
input?
Rc
output !
Cc
bacterium
bio-processing
Rc
person
question?
RRE
answer !
CRE
person
HRE
RRE
physically
encode
encode
physically
decode
decode
Fig. 13 The full compute cycle for the bacterial extrinsic computing
system. See text for details
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Firstly, there are scientific models, descriptive repre-
sentations of physical reality. In the diagrams, the model
and physical system are linked with an upward pointing
representation arrow. If there is a discrepancy between
such a model and reality, the model needs to be adjusted to
be a better fit.
Secondly, there are engineering models, prescriptive
specifications to be instantiated in physical reality. In the
diagrams, the model and physical system are linked with a
downward pointing instantiation arrow. If there is a dis-
crepancy between such model and reality, reality needs to
be re-engineered to be a better fit.
The presence of engineering models in the compute-
cycle gives us another criterion for deciding on the pres-
ence of computation, rather than mere physical action. If e
is too large, if the diagram does not sufficiently commute,
what is changed, the model or the instantiation? In an
engineered (or evolved) computational system, it will be
the instantiation.
– Using a calculator: if the user enters 2þ 3 ¼ and the
display says 11 , the calculator has to be fixed (or
maybe the user has to realise the display is in base 4).
– Mental arithmetic: if the person gets an answer other
than ‘‘5’’, they need to go on a remedial arithmetic
course.
– Intrinsic bacterial computing: if chem Y fails to bind to
the flagellar motor, the bacterial line needs to evolve
another chemical.
– Extrinsic bacterial computing: if the final bacterial state
is not the desired one, the bacterium needs to be re-
engineered.
There are additional places where errors may occur: the RE
may conceptualise their problem incorrectly, may instan-
tiate it in the computer incorrectly, or may decode the
result incorrectly. All of these require model or instantia-
tion changes, too.
5.2 Whose model is it anyway?
The models in the AR diagrams are made by us as AR
theorists external to the computational system. These are
our attempt to capture certain models implicitly or
explicitly used by the REs in order for them to exploit the
computational system.
In Fig. 8 the four models are our (AR theorist) models
of the physical layer components of Fig. 9. The RE may
use models in order to compute, but does not in general
itself construct AR diagrams.
So the model mpRE is our model of the RE’s problem,
constructed to help us determine the presence and nature of
the computation. The model mpc is our model of the RE’s
model of the computer and encoding; the RE’s own model
is also part of its physical state pRE. (The RE’s model of
mpc is an engineering model, as indicated by the direction
of the arrow; our model of the RE’s model is a scientific
model.) Similarly for the other models in Fig. 8.
In the case of a human RE, we may be able to interro-
gate them about their own models to help us build our
models; for non-human users, we need to take a more
indirect route. We elide this complexity in the figures, for
clarity. However, we must recognise the possibility that our
models may incorrectly capture the RE’s physical state and
problem, and its model of the computer (we have failed to
correctly model the RE/computer system), in addition to
the possibility that the RE may have incorrect models (the
RE is mistaken about its understanding of the computer).
When a discrepancy is discovered in our formulation of the
situation, we need to modify our descriptive models of the
RE’s descriptive and prescriptive models.
6 Conclusion
We have shown how the RE in AR theory can be incor-
porated into the compute cycle, and how this can illuminate
the physical RE using a physical device as a physical
computer. The RE does not need to be a human brain: an
example here shows intrinsic computing by a bacterial RE;
the case does have to be carefully argued, by demonstrating
the arbitrariness of the representation. This example
demonstrates how computing, whether conventional or
unconventional, can be broader than human use of com-
puters (external or brain-based), but is narrower than pan-
computationalism, in requiring the existence of an RE in
addition to the computer itself.
It may be that the RE does not even need to be organic,
or ‘alive’; it might potentially appear in the loop as an
engineered ‘proxy’ for the ultimate RE, for example, the
plant (proxy RE) in a control system using the controller
(physical computer) to maintain itself in a particular
behaviour. In future work we will investigate how far the
concept of the RE can be removed from a living user.
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